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Southern Cal. Edison v. State Dep’t of Taxation, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 49 (Jul. 27, 2017)1 
 
TAX LAW: USE TAX & THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 
Summary: 
 
The Court considered whether an electrical utility company was entitled to a tax refund 
after it had paid taxes under an alleged discriminatory taxation scheme. The Court held that the 
company was not entitled to a tax refund because the company’s statutory construction argument 
regarding NRS 372.270 in conjunction with NRS 372.185 would create absurd results. Moreover, 
the company did not provide sufficient evidence demonstrating substantially situated competitors 
who benefited from the unconstitutional taxation scheme. Finally, the Court found that the 
company was not entitled to a tax credit for the money it paid to an out-of-state tax because the 
tax was not a sales tax.  
 
Background: 
 
The Court considered whether Southern California Edison (“Edison”) was due a use tax 
refund given Edison’s allegation that because it alleged to make the requisite showing of favored 
competitors. Alternatively, the Court considered whether Edison is owed a tax credit in an amount 
equal to the transaction privilege tax (TPT) levied by Arizona. Prior to this case, the Court 
recognized that “[v]iolations of the dormant Commerce Clause are remedied by compensating for 
the negative impact to the claimant as measured by the unfair advantage provided to the claimant’s 
competitors.”2 
 
Edison is an electrical utility company that owned a majority interest in the Mohave 
Generation Station – a power plant that bought coal exclusively from Peabody Western Coal 
Company (“Peabody”). Peabody extracted the coal in Arizona. Respondent State of Nevada 
Department of Taxation (“Department”) levied a use tax on the coal Edison purchased from 
Peabody, pursuant to NRS 372.185.  Between March 1998 and December 2000, during Edison 
and Peabody’s course of business, Edison paid $23,986,668 in Nevada use tax and $9,703,087.52 
due to the Arizona (TPT).  
 
Edison filed a claim against the Department and the Nevada Tax Commission for a refund 
and/or tax credit – both of which were denied. As a result, Edison filed a claim in the district court, 
which stayed Edison’s proceedings while awaiting the decision from Sierra Pacific. After Sierra 
Pacific was decided, the district court concluded that NRS 372.270 was unconstitutional, however, 
Edison was not entitled to a refund because it did not have any favored competitors that benefited 
from the discriminatory taxation scheme.  
 
Discussion: 
 
 On appeal, Edison advanced three arguments:  
																																																						
1  By Karson Bright  
2  See Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. State Dep’t of Taxation, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 93, 338 P.3d 1244, 1246 (2014).  
 
(1) NRS 372.185 (use tax) and NRS 372.270 (use tax exemption) can be 
harmonized to bring NRS 372.270 within constitutional parameters, and, 
under this construction, Edison is entitled to a refund because the use tax 
does not apply to coal purchases; (2) if the Court did not apply Edison’s 
proposed statutory construction, NRS 372.270 is impermissibly 
discriminatory under the dormant Commerce Clause and Edison made a 
showing of advantaged competitors caused by NRS 372.270, thereby 
entitling Edison to a refund pursuant to Sierra Pacific; and (3) if [the] Court 
decides that Edison is not owed a refund, Edison is entitled to a tax credit 
for the TPT Arizona levied on the coal’s production.3  
 
NRS 372.270 cannot be harmonized with NRS 372.185 to bring it within constitutional parameters 
  
Edison argued that NRS 372.270 is capable of being constitutional if it is harmonized with 
NRS 372.185. With this construction, Edison’s coal purchases would qualify for the exemption in 
NRS 372.270. In response to Edison’s statutory construction argument, the Court reviewed 
Edison’s question de novo.4 The Court next looked to Nevada’s use and sales tax statutory scheme, 
which is structured as follows: 
 
Under Nevada law, sales and use taxes are complementary, yet mutually exclusive. 
Sales tax applies to the sale of tangible personal property within the state. NRS 
372.105. Conversely, use tax applies to the use, storage, and consumption of 
tangible personal property within the state. NRS 372.185 … The use tax 
complements the sales tax so that all tangible personal property sold or utilized in 
Nevada is subject to taxation. Use taxation is also a way for Nevada to tax 
transactions outside the state that would otherwise escape sales taxation. The 
incidence of Nevada’s use tax falls directly upon the party that makes the out-of-
state purchase and uses property within the state.5 
 
The Court found that NRS 372.185 imposes a tax on the use, storage, or consumption 
purchased out-of-state that would have been a taxable sale if it occurred in Nevada, whereas NRS 
372.270 exempted from sales and use tax the gross receipts from the sale, storage, use, or 
consumption in Nevada. As a result, the Court found that NRS 372.270’s effect is to favor in-state 
mines over out-of-state mines.  
 
Edison Contended that NRS 372.270 could be read in a way that avoids interstate 
discrimination citing the Court’s prior rulings regarding statutory interpretation, which state: 
“[w]hen the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would render it 
constitutional and valid and the other unconstitutional and void, that construction should be 
adopted which will save the statute.”6 
																																																						
3  Southern Cal. Edison v. State Dep’t of Taxation, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 49, 5 (Jul. 27, 2017). 
4  See I. Cox Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., LLC, 129 Nev. 139, 142, 296 P.3d 1202, 1203 (2013). 
5  See State Dep’t of Taxation v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., 110 Nev. 276, 280, 871 P.2d 331, 334–35 (1994).  
6  See Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 619, 262 P.3d 1123, 1130 (2011) (quoting Virginia & Truckee R.R. Co. v. Henry, 
8 Nev. 165, 174 (1873)).  
 
However, the Court found that Edison’s reading of the statutes would produce absurd 
results and therefore declined to adhere to Edison’s proposed construction.7 Edison’s reading was 
absurd because it would confuse the location of the mine with the location of the sale. Furthermore, 
Edison’s harmonization would also avoid net proceeds tax on its transactions with Peabody and 
allow companies to completely avoid use, sales, and net proceeds taxation – which was not what 
the legislature intended. The Court concluded, citing its language from Sierra Pacific, that NRS 
372.270 was originally enacted only “to avoid taxing the proceeds of mines already subject to the 
net proceeds tax.”8 
 
Edison does not have substantially similar favored competitors that benefited from the 
discriminatory taxation scheme 
 
 Next, Edison argues that if NRS 372.270 is not harmonized with NRS 372.185 consistent 
with its proposed construction, the district court’s finding that NRS 372.270 is unconstitutional 
under the dormant Commerce Clause should stand. Similarly, the Department also did not dispute 
the district court’s determination that NRS 372.270’s tax exemption was unconstitutional so the 
Court only considered Edison’s claim for a full refund of the taxes it paid on the coal purchase. 
  
Edison contends that it presented the district court with adequate evidence of favored 
competitors that would entitle it to a full refund under Sierra Pacific. The Court looked to an 
excerpt of the district court’s holding, which stated: “there are no facts in the record to support a 
finding that [Edison], by paying use tax on its purchase of the coal slurry, is being discriminated 
against in comparison to a similarly situated tax payer” and that “[Edison] did not pay any higher 
taxes than did its competitors.” For this finding of fact in the trial court, this Court could not reverse 
“unless the judgment is clearly erroneous and not based on substantial evidence.”9 Moreover, the 
Court also recognized that “[s]tate courts have the duty of determining the appropriate relief for 
Commerce Clause violations, and, to satisfy due process requirements, courts must provide some 
‘meaningful backward-looking relief’ to correct taxes paid pursuant to an unconstitutional 
scheme.”10  
 
The Court concluded that the proper analysis for determining whether favored competitor 
to Edison existed would be to first answer the threshold question of whether the competitor was a 
“substantially similar entity” to Edison before determining whether Edison was entitled to a 
monetary remedy as a result of a dormant Commerce Clause violation.11 For a dormant Commerce 
Clause violation to exist, the claimed discrimination must create a competitive advantage between 
																																																						
7  See City Plan Dev., Inc. v. Office of Labor Comm’r, 121 Nev. 419, 435, 117 P.3d 182, 192 (2005) (“When 
interpreting a statute, this court … seek[s] to avoid an interpretation that leads to an absurd result.”). 
8  See Sierra Pac., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 93, 338 P.3d at 1248,  
9  See Certified Fire Prot., Inc. v. Precision Constr., Inc., 128 Nev. 371, 377, 283 P.3d 250, 254 (2012) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
10  See Sierra Pac., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 93, 338 P.3d at 1248 (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic 
Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Reg. of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990)).  
11  See Sierra Pac., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 93, 338 P.3d at 1249 n. 7 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 
278, 298–99 (1997). 
these “substantially similar entities,” however the competitive markets are generally narrowly 
drawn.12 
 
Based on this analysis, and similar to the holding in Sierra Pacific, the Court found that 
Edison does not compete against power companies that use coal mined within Nevada because 
there is not enough coal to justify commercial operations.13 Therefore, because the Court declined 
to draw the market in such a way to compare coal producers to producers of natural gas, solar, and 
other sources of energy, Edison failed to prove there were any similarly situated coal producers 
who were favored due to the taxation scheme.  
 
Edison is not entitled to a tax credit based on the TPT paid to Arizona 
 
Finally, Edison argues that even if a refund is not warranted, it is entitled to a $9,703,087.52 
tax credit because it paid the TPT in Arizona. The Court first looked to the Nevada Administrative 
Code, which states that the Department will allow a tax credit if the tax (in this case, for the TPT) 
if the tax is considered to be a sales tax.14 Determining whether the TPT was a sales tax was a 
question of law for the Court.15 Regarding the TPT, the Arizona Supreme Court and the Arizona 
Department of Revenue have found that the TPT is to be distinguished from a sales tax; the tax is 
on the privilege of doing business in Arizona and is not a true sales tax.16 
 
Based on the findings from the Arizona Supreme Court, this Court found that the TPT was 
not a true sales tax that would warrant Edison a tax credit. Furthermore, the Court found that even 
if the TPT was a sales tax, it was Peabody who bore the cost of the tax and Edison was merely 
reimbursing them.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
Edison is not entitled to any tax refund because NRS 372.270 could not be harmonized 
with NRS 372.185 and Edison did not show that there were substantially similar competitors that 
were advantage by the unconstitutional tax. Furthermore, Edison is also not entitled to a tax credit 
because the TPT is not a sales tax within the meaning of NAC 372.055.  
																																																						
12  See id. (citing General Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 301–03).  
13  See Sierra Pac., 130 Adv. Nev. Op. 93, 338 P.3d at 1249 & n.6.  
14  See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 372.055.  
15  See Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 129 Nev. 15, 19, 293 P.3d 869, 872 (2013).  
16  See City of Phoenix v. West Publ’g Co., 712 P.2d 944, 946–47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
